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Abstract
Through the exponential growth in digital devices and computational capabilities, big data technologies are putting pres-
sure upon the boundaries of what can or cannot be considered acceptable from an ethical perspective. Much of the literature 
on ethical issues related to big data and big data technologies focuses on separate values such as privacy, human dignity, 
justice or autonomy. More holistic approaches, allowing a more comprehensive view and better balancing of values, usually 
focus on either a design-based approach, in which it is tried to implement values into the design of new technologies, or an 
application-based approach, in which it is tried to address the ways in which new technologies are used. Some integrated 
approaches do exist, but typically are more general in nature. This offers a broad scope of application, but may not always be 
tailored to the specific nature of big data related ethical issues. In this paper we distil a comprehensive set of ethical values 
from existing design-based and application-based ethical approaches for new technologies and further focus these values to 
the context of emerging big data technologies. A total of four value lists (from techno-moral values, value-sensitive design, 
anticipatory emerging technology ethics and biomedical ethics) were selected for this. The integrated list consists of a total 
of ten values: human welfare, autonomy, non-maleficence, justice, accountability, trustworthiness, privacy, dignity, solidarity 
and environmental welfare. Together, this set of values provides a comprehensive and in-depth overview of the values that 
are to be taken into account for emerging big data technologies.
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Introduction
Big data (Kerr and Earle 2013) is often considered to be the 
new gold or the new oil (Lohr 2012). Some authors have com-
pared the implications of big data with those of the industrial 
revolution (Richards and King 2014). In Germany, the term 
Industrie 4.0 is used in order to indicate that this is a fourth 
industrial revolution, after those triggered by the steam 
engine, electricity and computers respectively (Jasperneite 
2012). The enormous quantities of data that are collected, 
stored and processed may considerably improve the speed, 
effectiveness and quality of decision-making and innovation 
for companies, governments and researchers. The potential 
of big data and big data technologies is proving adept in the 
discovery of novel trends, patterns and relationships. As noted 
by the OECD (2014), the social and economic value of data is 
mainly reaped when data are transformed into information and 
knowledge (gaining insights) and then used for decision mak-
ing (taking action): this is enabled by the ubiquitous “datafica-
tion” (Cukier and Mayer-Schönberger 2013) of the physical 
world and by the new pervasive power of data analytics.
There is no well-established definition of big data, but 
obviously its most prominent characteristic is its sheer vol-
ume. Apart from that, other characteristics are relevant, such 
as its high velocity (often real-time or nearly real-time) and 
 * Karolina La Fors 
 k.la.fors@law.leidenuniv.nl
 Bart Custers 
 B.H.M.Custers@law.leidenuniv.nl
 Esther Keymolen 
 e.l.o.keymolen@law.leidenuniv.nl
1 Centre for Law and Digital Technologies (eLaw), Leiden 
University, Kamerlingh Onnes Building, Steenschuur 25, 
2311 ES Leiden, The Netherlands
2 Centre for Law and Digital Technologies (eLaw), Leiden 
University, Postbus 9520, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
3 Tilburg Institute for Law and Technology (TILT), 
Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, 
The Netherlands
210 K. La Fors et al.
1 3
its unstructured nature (including text, numbers, images, 
videos and sound). These characteristics of big data pose 
significant challenges to analytics. Typically, big data does 
not allow the human eye or human intuition to overview the 
data and the patterns and relationships hidden in it. Such 
hidden knowledge can usually only be discovered using 
advanced methods for data analysis. These new information 
technologies are termed as big data technologies. Some of 
these big data technologies focus on the storage of big data 
or the data management, but perhaps the most important 
category of big data technologies is that of big data analyt-
ics, which includes technologies such as data mining and 
machine learning (Calders and Custers 2013).
As with all new technologies, the question arises how to 
implement big data technologies in a manner that adheres 
to moral values that are considered to be at the heart of our 
Western societies. Through the exponential growth in digital 
devices and their computational capabilities, big data and big 
data technologies are putting increasing pressure upon the 
boundaries of what can or cannot be considered acceptable 
from an ethical perspective. By putting pressure upon such 
important ethical values as autonomy, non-discrimination, 
fairness, justice, privacy or human dignity they increasingly 
generate ethical issues that are specific to a variety of big data 
contexts.
Although literature specifically focussing on ethical 
issues related to big data and big data technologies is stead-
ily expanding (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014; Boyd and 
Crawford 2011; Engin and Ruppert 2015; Hasselbalch and 
Tranberg 2016; Strandburg 2014; Zook et al. 2017), much of 
this research focuses on separate, individual values such as 
privacy (Schermer et al. 2014), human dignity, justice (Sax 
2016), autonomy (Pagallo 2012) or equality/non-discrimi-
nation (Barocas and Selbst 2016). Although this research is 
very valuable, for example, to flesh out specific values, it 
generally does not take a holistic approach. This can be a 
miss, particularly when values are competing. For instance, 
when focusing on a value like equality or non-discrimination, 
it may be very helpful to use highly sensitive personal data in 
big data predictive modelling (Zliobaite and Custers 2016). 
At the same time, the use of such highly sensitive personal 
data may interfere with values like privacy and autonomy (in 
terms of informational self-determination). Hence, a more 
holistic approach, taking into account sets of values (rather 
than individual values) is highly preferable, as it allows a 
more comprehensive view and further balancing of values.
In existing literature on such holistic approaches on eth-
ics and information technology, there are basically two 
approaches to deal with sets of ethical issues regarding new 
technologies. The first approach is a design-based approach, 
in which it is tried to implement values into the design of 
new technologies. The second approach is an application-
based approach, in which it is tried to address the ways in 
which new technologies are used. The first approach could 
be considered an a priori approach, whereas the second 
approach could be considered an a posteriori approach. 
However, there does not exist an integrated approach.
The lack of an integrated approach of design-based and 
application based approaches is a miss, as none of the two 
approaches covers the circular life-cycle of big data tech-
nologies. The neat theoretical distinction between different 
stages of technological innovation does not always exist in 
practice, especially not in the development of big data tech-
nologies (Fuglslang 2001). What is supposed to be a phased 
development process, from the flexible phase of invention 
or design to the more closed phase of adoption and use, in 
practice often is an iterative approach or circular life-cycle1 
in which new technologies and new applications of existing 
technologies are built on each other. In such processes, the 
different stages are sometimes overlapping, sometimes non-
sequential and sometimes running in parallel. Also, big data 
based products and services are never really finished, but 
rather are continuously updated and revised. This is prob-
lematic for the abovementioned ethical approaches, as it may 
be hard to choose the most appropriate ethical approach.
A consequence of this integrated, holistic approach is that 
also a more heterogenic network of actors are involved in 
upholding these values (Akrich 1992; Bijker 1995; Bijker and 
Law 1992; Latour 1987). Not just the engineers or designers 
of the big data technologies and applications, but also policy 
makers, citizens and users have a joint responsibility in cul-
tivating ethical values (Vedder and Custers 2009).
Another miss in the existing literature is that none of the 
ethical approaches is specifically focused on big data and 
big data technologies. The approaches suggested typically 
are somewhat general in nature, which offers a broad scope 
of applying them, but this may not always be tailored to 
the specific nature of big data related ethical issues. In the 
context of big data, there may exist not only ethical issues 
on how to interpret and safeguard values and on how to bal-
ance competing or conflicting values, also issues in which it 
may be unclear which values are at stake and issues in which 
some values may not have been identified yet.
The goal of this paper is to integrate existing design-based 
and application-based ethical approaches for new technolo-
gies and further focus this integrated result to the context of 
big data technologies. This will provide a comprehensive 
1 Not to be confused with product life cycles in which products are 
intruded in markets and decline after the end of their life cycle. When 
referring to the circularity of big data life cycles we consider that 
data use involves a continuous learning curve with periodic reflec-
tions upon the original purposes of a given big data technology. Such 
reflection often includes changes, for instance, in prognostic criteria 
or even on more fundamental levels of technology design, in order to 
better meet new societal developments.
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and in-depth overview and list of values that are to be taken 
into account for emerging big data technologies. The use 
of this overview and value list can also be beneficial for 
rolling out social impact assessments (Wright 2012; Wright 
and De Hert 2012) with respect to big data technologies in 
a diversity of contexts.
The findings in this paper are based on the preliminary 
results of a project funded by the European Commission 
(Custers et  al. 2017). This project, called e-SIDES has 
received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme under grant agreement 
No. 731873. This paper is divided into five sections. In Sec-
tion two we describe and further explain the methodology/
approach taken in this paper. In Section three we introduce 
two lists from the domain of responsible research and inno-
vation, one from applied virtue theory, and one list deriving 
from the area-specific discourse on biomedical ethics. In 
Section four we distil from these lists an overview of values 
that are both useful for implementation in the design and 
the practical use of big data technologies. In Section five we 
provide recommendations regarding how our integrated list 
of values could be beneficial in assessing the broader ethical 
implications of big data technologies.
Approach
In order to integrate existing design-based and application-
based ethical approaches for new technologies and further 
focus the resulting list of values to the context of emerging 
big data technologies, we used a two-step approach. First, we 
explain how we collected and selected existing approaches. 
Second, we explain how we distilled from the selected 
approaches a comprehensive overview of relevant values in 
the context of emerging big data technologies.
Collection and selection
Our starting point was to look for any literature containing 
lists of values, from different ethical perspectives, regardless 
of the context for which they are intended or in which they 
are used. Hence, also lists of values for non-technological 
contexts were considered. Only literature that included a list 
of values, indicating a more holistic approach, was included; 
literature on a single value was not considered. Our search 
included literature on historical lists in virtue ethics, lists 
in healthcare and other societal sectors (such as education, 
food and life sciences, journalism, business ethics, etc.), lit-
erature on design-based considerations for engineering, lit-
erature on application-based and procedural considerations 
for new technologies, literature on values for emerging or 
novel technologies and literature on novel branches of virtue 
ethics. Our desk research yielded a broad collection of in 
total 21 value lists with sets of values from different ethical 
perspectives. An overview of this longlist can be found in 
Appendix A.
Out of these 21 lists, the first two lists emerged as his-
torical lists in virtue ethics. Consequently, the first value 
list we considered is of Aristotle’s virtues (Aristotle 1947) 
and the second of St. Thomas of Aquinas (McInerny 1997). 
We also assessed value lists or ethical codes of more recent 
times and were most prominent for certain societal contexts 
or disciplines. (They contained prominent ethical codes for 
certain professions only). Here we distinguished lists that 
were meant for healthcare oriented professions, that appear 
to be more abundant and elaborated, and lists that were 
meant for professions beyond healthcare. We assessed five 
lists that were prominent in healthcare. These are the value 
list of bioethics by Beauchamp and Childress (2012a, b), 
the Declaration of Helsinki, containing ethical principles for 
medical research involving human subjects (World Medical 
Association 2010), a list called nine ethical values of master 
therapists (Jennings et al. 2005), a list containing principles 
for health technology assessment (Turchetti et al. 2010), and 
the ethical matrix of Mepham (2010), which is a list from the 
context of food ethics in relation to healthcare.
Beyond the discipline of healthcare we assessed the five 
further values lists that are prominent in particular disci-
plines or professions. This category of lists contains a list 
on professional codes of ethics of the (US) National Society 
of Professional Engineers (NSPE Ethics Reference Guide 
for Engineers 2017) a list of the values and ethics codes 
of social workers (Parrott 2014), a list including a code of 
ethics of professional journalists (Society of Professional 
Journalists 2014), a list of business ethics principles for 
executives (Josephson Institute of Ethics 2010), and a list of 
the School of Educators which contains ethical principles 
for teachers (2012).
With respect to value lists focusing on the design phase 
of technologies, we identified list of value-sensitive design 
(Friedman et al. 2006). Searching for application-based 
approaches yielded two lists, i.e., Google’s AI principles 
aimed at ethical principles for daily use and the datasheets 
for datasets approach (Gebru et al. 2018). Focusing on lists 
relevant for novel and emerging technologies, we identified 
three value lists: the anticipatory emerging technology eth-
ics list of Philip Brey (2012), an ethical delphi for assessing 
ethical issues emerging in relation to novel biotechnologies 
(Millar et al. 2007), and the technomoral value list of Shan-
non Vallor (2016). When examining novel branches of virtue 
ethics, we identified three further lists: a list on feminist eth-
ics (Jagger 1991), a list on insurrectionist ethics (McBride 
2017), and a list on marxist ethics (Beckledge 2008). The 
next step was to select which lists are most appropriate to 
use for further integration and contextualization for emerg-
ing big data technologies. It may be obvious that many of 
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the ancient lists are more complicated to apply to these new 
technologies, but nevertheless they are very valuable as they 
represent rather general values. When lists are in the same 
line of thought, we chose the list that is most developed 
towards big data technologies. For instance, the lists of 
Aristotle and of St. Thomas of Aquinas were not selected, 
because Shannon Vallor’s list of technomoral virtues (see 
below) relies on both these lists. Therefore, we use her list 
of values rather than the ones she builds on.
Another selection criterion for narrowing down the 
number of collected lists was that lists of values should not 
be at an aggregated level. For instance, Mepham’s ethical 
matrix, although it has prominent influence in biomedical 
ethics, was not included in our analysis because Mepham 
uses aggregated values in his matrix. He clusters individual 
values in three groups, welfare, dignity and justice. These 
values are already represented in several other lists.
At the other end of the spectrum, lists of values that are 
too context specific were not included. This applies to most 
of the professional codes of ethics2 that were identified. 
These are often based on other lists, such as that of Aris-
totle, and they are often strongly context specific, making 
it hard to apply them for emerging big data technologies. It 
should be noted that no list of values was found that actually 
had big data or big data technologies as its specific context.
This process of collection and selection resulted in four 
highly relevant lists of values. These high quality lists are 
widely acknowledged in applied ethics and constitute indis-
pensable bases for the integration approach in this paper. 
The first value list is a technomoral value list introduced by 
Shannon Vallor (2016), the second is the value list for antic-
ipatory emerging technologies introduced by Philip Brey 
(2012), the third a value list is the list for values-sensitive 
design (VSD) introduced by Batya Friedman et al. (2006) 
and the fourth is a value list for biomedical ethics introduced 
by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (2012a, b). The 
biomedical ethics list may seem a bit strange in this context, 
as the technologies and practices are somewhat disanalogous 
to big data at first sight, but it is included because bioethics 
is among the first and most developed branches of applied 
ethics. Furthermore, the field of bioethics was developed in 
reaction to rapid developments in technology and medicine 
in the twentieth century, a situation that bears some resem-
blance to the current rapid developments in big data technol-
ogy. Both situations try to deal with ‘technological turbu-
lence’ and with situations in which the technology allows for 
many options, but in which at the same time a clear norma-
tive framework for assessing those options is lacking. These 
four lists together cover both the design-based approach and 
the application-based approach discussed above. The lists 
of both Friedman et al. and Brey focus on the design-stage. 
These lists can be applied to big data technologies but are 
not specifically tailored to these technologies. The list of 
Beauchamp and Childress focuses on the application-stage, 
but does not specifically take into account big data technolo-
gies. The list of Vallor does include both design and applica-
tion stage, but is not tailored to big data technologies. The 
background and contents of the four selected lists will be 
discussed in the next section.
Integration
The next step was distilling from these four lists a single list 
of values that can be used in the context of emerging big 
data technologies. The goal was to come to a comprehensive 
list, in line with the more holistic approach that we think is 
needed. However, looking at the values on the selected lists 
of values, it is obvious that some of these values may have a 
very different meaning, even though some of them have the 
same names. Sometimes, a values is already significantly 
disputed with the context of one list. For instance, a value 
like justice can have very different interpretations, ranging 
from justice as fairness, justice as desert or justice as equal-
ity. Moreover, some lists have different labels for similar val-
ues. For instance, one list mentions honesty, which another 
list labels veracity. Furthermore, since the lists are all dif-
ferent, it is obvious that some lists lack particular values 
mentioned on other lists. For instance, privacy is mentioned 
on two lists, but absent on two other lists. All this makes it 
hard to really align the four lists. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that the goal is not to force a fit or tweak 
all lists into one singular list, but rather to distil or extract a 
comprehensive list of values from these lists.
Therefore, we do not describe in-depth the exact meaning 
of each value on each list in that specific context (an exegesis 
we consider beyond the scope of this paper), but take a more 
abstract approach. Hence, instead of arguing that a value like 
justice means x in the context of one list and y in the context 
of another list and trying to align those meanings, we reason 
as follows: acknowledging its different interpretations in dif-
ferent contexts, we see justice as a value appearing on all 
lists, so it must be a key value. For that reason only, we put 
it on our comprehensive list and then consider how justice 
should be regarded in the context of big data technologies. 
The latter part, applying particular values in the context of 
big data technologies, can obviously be inspired by the dif-
ferent meanings of the values on the four lists.
When trying to distil a comprehensive set of values from 
the four lists of values from different ethical perspectives, 
2 Biomedical ethics is generally considered as a professional, area-
specific ethics. Yet, we included it as one of the four lists we identify 
values from for big data contexts. Given that through its main prin-
ciples biomedical ethics, independently from contexts, prioritizes the 
utmost protection of human life, the applicability of its principles for 
big data contexts seems almost evident.
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important methodological issues in our approach are to ensure 
completeness and avoid overlap. Should a value be considered 
as relevant only when it appears on all lists or already when it 
appears on only one list? Or something in between? An obvi-
ous approach would be to add all lists of values to each other, 
but that would create a long list with many overlaps. At the 
other end of the spectrum of integration methods would be to 
only include those values present on all lists of values, but that 
would create a list of values that may not be comprehensive 
with respect to emerging big data technologies.
Starting with the first consideration (i.e., overlapping val-
ues in one integrated list), ideally, we would like to create a 
list of values that do not overlap. However, also in this case it 
is important to note that a list of non-overlapping issues is not 
realistic. Such a non-overlapping categorization does not exist 
in any of the ethical perspectives under consideration in this 
paper. Hence, even though the values identified are distinctly 
different, they may overlap to some extent. An example of 
this is automated decision-making on the basis of big data 
analytics by profiling. In such processes the autonomy of data 
subjects may be infringed as such decisions often constrain 
choices of the profiled individual. At the same time also trans-
parency about these processes may be lacking which in itself 
constrains choices and consequently can contribute to limit 
autonomy. Although autonomy and transparency are distinctly 
different issues, in their effects they can overlap.
Regarding the second consideration (i.e., completeness or 
exhaustiveness of the integrated list), we obviously want to 
create a list of values that is as complete as possible. However, 
although a complete, exhaustive list of values is the ideal goal, 
it is important to note that it is impossible to provide such a 
complete, exhaustive list. On the one hand, because no theo-
retical framework exists that is a closed system in which it is 
possible to take an exhaustive approach. On the other hand, 
even if a closed system were available, it would be impossible 
to take an exhaustive approach because the big data technolo-
gies and applications are rapidly changing all the time (Vallor 
2016). Nevertheless, we think the comprehensive approach for 
and integrated list of values in big data contexts in this paper 
makes it very likely that the most important issues in each of 
the disciplines investigated are actually identified.
To avoid both pitfalls, navigating between Scylla and 
Charybdis, we took a more tailor-made approach in which 
we assessed each value separately. For this assessment, we 
refer to Section four of this paper.
Furthermore, we used two methods to validate our results 
in practice. First, the values resulting from the literature 
review were supplemented with expert knowledge from the 
researchers in the project and external experts. The expert 
knowledge was used to assess the completeness and exhaus-
tiveness of the collected results (see “Collection and selec-
tion”). Where apparent gaps appeared, expert knowledge 
was used to add further issues to the lists and further qualify 
the values on the lists. Furthermore, expert knowledge was 
used to categorize the results into clear, well-defined cat-
egories that avoid overlapping (to the extent possible, see 
above). Experts were consulted within the professional net-
works of the researchers involved in the project,3 but also at 
expert forums.4
Second, two workshops were organized to obtain addi-
tional in-depth knowledge on the values identified and to iden-
tify new ones, and, to validate the preliminary results of our 
integration. One workshop was co-located with a major ethics 
conference,5 the other workshop was co-located with a major 
big data conference.6 The workshop format was designed to 
allow for the maximum participation and interaction of the 
attendees, with a live survey to gather and discuss opinions. 
In particular, the workshops focused on to what extent the par-
ticipants considered these challenges relevant in the big data 
arena and thus to be taken into account by the community.
Note that both the expert consultations and the two work-
shops were used for validation only—this research could have 
been done with the literature review only. However, in order 
to further ensure our comprehensive approach, we added 
these elements to our methodology. The experts were pre-
sented the four selected lists of values together with our inte-
grated list of values, next we talked them through our goals 
and approaches and then asked them whether we were miss-
ing important values and discussed with them the resulting 
list of values and how to apply these values in the context of 
big data technologies. In most instances, this just confirmed 
that our list of values was considered comprehensive by the 
experts and that we were using a sound approach. The discus-
sions with the expert were particularly valuable in deepening 
our understanding of and thinking on how to regard particular 
values in the context of big data technologies.
Values for emerging technologies
In this section we introduce four value lists that are highly 
valuable and esteemed in ethics, on which we base the 
integration approach in this paper: one from the domain of 
applied ethics, two from the domain of responsible research 
and innovation and one list from an area-specific discourse: 
3 www.e-sides .eu.
4 e-SIDES Workshop at the 23rd ICE/IEEE Conference, Madeira, 
June 28th 2017—Retrieved on 12th January 2018 from http://www.e-
sides .eu/media /madei rawor kshop -prese ntati on.
5 e-SIDES Workshop at CEPE/Ethicomp 2017 University of 
Torino—Retrieved on 12th January 2018 from http://www.e-sides .eu/
media /turin -works hoppr esent ation .
6 e-SIDES Workshop at European Big Data Value Forum 2017 
Towards Privacy-preserving Big Data—Retrieved on 12th January 
2018 from http://www.eside s.eu/news-event s/e-sides -works hop-at-
ebdvf -2017-towar ds-priva cy-prese rving -big-data.
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biomedical ethics. More specifically, the first subsection 
addresses the technomoral value list introduced by Shan-
non Vallor (2016), the second subsection the value list for 
values-sensitive design (VSD) introduced by Batya Fried-
man et al. (2006) the third one the value list for anticipatory 
emerging technologies introduced by Philip Brey (2012), 
and the fourth subsection deals with the value list for bio-
medical ethics introduced by Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress (2012a, b). From the perspective of our integrated 
approach for big data technologies all four lists are of vital, 
yet at the same time also partial, relevance. Each list encap-
sulates differing characteristics regarding the extent to which 
we consider it vital for our integrated approach. However, 
the partiality of these lists is also a reason in itself for their 
integration.
List of ‘technomoral values’
Shannon Vallor’s technomoral values are from the perspec-
tive of our integrated approach for big data technologies 
vital, because she is a pioneer in her approach in investi-
gating current intricacies at the cross-roads of emerging 
technologies and virtue ethics and she applies moral virtues 
that have existed for centuries to emerging technologies. 
She bases her analysis on ancient Greek philosophers like 
Aristotle (1947), medieval Christian philosophers like St 
Thomas of Aquinas (1997) and also Eastern philosophies 
like Confucianism (Confucius 1997). However, she argues 
these century-old virtues need explicit adaptation to our cur-
rent technology-mediated times. Moreover, she underlines 
the acute need for exploring what ethical values and norms 
are about to erode in our digitalized society: “we need to 
cultivate in ourselves, collectively, a special kind of moral 
character, one that expresses what I will call the technomoral 
virtues.” (2016, p. 1) Furthermore, she focuses both on the 
design and the application phase of emerging technologies. 
Throughout her philosophical and socio-technical explo-
ration of ethical challenges she defines the following ten 
values as most worthy of upholding: honesty, self-control, 
humility, justice, courage, empathy, care, civility, flexibility, 
perspective, magnanimity and technomoral wisdom7 (see 
Table 1).
Yet, regarding our integrated approach, her list only 
provides a partial fit. Notably, throughout her technomoral 
values list, her selection of values does not account for the 
Table 1  Virtues to uphold during techno-social change and specifically regarding big data technologies
Tables 1 and 2 are modified, yet highly rely on the two tables shown in Deliverable 2.1 of the e-SIDES project written by Custers et al. (2017)
Technomoral values (Vallor 
2016)
Values from value-sensitive 
design (VSD) (Friedman 
et al. 2006)
Values from Anticipatory 
emerging technology eth-
ics (Brey 2012)
Values in biomedical 
ethics (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2012a, b)
Integration: values for big 
data technologies
Care Human Welfare Well-being and the com-
mon good
Beneficence Human welfare
Magnanimity, courage Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy
Humility, self-control Calmness Health, (no) bodily and 
psychological harm
Non-maleficence Non-maleficence
Justice Freedom from bias; Uni-
versal usability
Justice (distributive) Justice Justice (incl. equality, non-
discrimination, digital 
inclusion)
Perspective Accountability N/A N/A Accountability (incl. trans-
parency)
Honesty, self-control Trust N/A Veracity Trustworthiness (including 
honesty and underpinning 
also security)
N/A Privacy; informed consent; 
ownership and property
Rights and freedoms, 
including Property
N/A Privacy
Empathy Identity Human dignity Respect for dignity Dignity
Empathy, flexibility, cour-
age, civility
Courtesy N/A N/A Solidarity
Courage, empathy Environmental Sustain-
ability
(No) environmental harm, 
Animal welfare
N/A Environmental welfare
7 As to technomoral wisdom, we will not dive deeply into this value, 
because as Vallor calls it: this is rather a “general condition of well-
cultivated and integrated moral expertise” (Vallor 2016, p. 154) to 
navigate virtuously among emerging technologies. We acknowledge 
though that technomoral wisdom is served by all other eleven values 
and at the same time technomoral wisdom should also be enshrined 
in virtuous action in relation to emerging technologies, consequently 
also in relation to big data technologies.
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circular life-cycle of big data technologies where phases of 
design and application often overlap, run parallel or flow 
from each other. Second, although she stresses the impor-
tance of the collective cultivation of values, she does not 
use a holistic approach regarding the network of stake-
holders involved in big data relations (such as engineers, 
developers, designers, data scientists, users, data subjects, 
citizens, policy makers and legislators). This seems to be a 
miss, as the successful cultivation of ethical values hinges 
upon the extent to which these values are shared, respected 
and enacted mutually throughout relationships in big data-
mediated networks. One stakeholder alone cannot uphold a 
value, but such upholding also requires mutual efforts from 
other stakeholders involved.
List of values from value‑sensitive design
The value-sensitive design (VSD) list of Friedman et al. is 
from different perspectives vital and from different perspec-
tives partial in relevance regarding our integrated approach 
for big data technologies. Extensive research demonstrates 
that the need for value-sensitivity in design is indispensable 
(Manders-Huits and Van den Hoven 2009; Van den Hoven 
2013), therefore using a prominent value list of VSD for the 
integration of our value list for big data contexts is vital. The 
value-sensitive design value list is vital more specifically, 
first because it clearly defines criteria for value-conscious 
innovation, including new information and communication 
technologies. Second, the value list of VSD does not position 
designers as neutral agents who only fulfil the production of 
technologies, but as agents who shall be held accountable for 
the effects of their inventions on the broader public (Fried-
man et al. 2006).Therefore, designers should account for 
moral values already during the designing process of tech-
nologies. Friedman, Kahn and Borning in their work define 
a set of human values with ethical import, which they sug-
gest not as a comprehensive list, but as a set of values that 
can guide developments of value-sensitive technologies for 
human use. A third important reason why their list is vital 
for our integration is, that in their selection of values Fried-
man et al. rely on an extensive list of scholarly literature 
that advocates for the implementation and active use of one 
or more of these values. Their list comprises the following 
VSD values (Ibid.; 17–18): human welfare, ownership and 
property, privacy, freedom from bias, universal usability, 
trust, autonomy, informed consent, accountability, courtesy, 
identity, calmness, and environmental sustainability (see 
Table 1). According to Friedman et al. the first nine values 
can be considered as requirements to embrace in general 
technology design environments, whereas courtesy, identity, 
calmness and environmental sustainability are value-require-
ments for specific kinds of technology design. However, the 
value-sensitive design value list from the perspective of our 
integrated approach is also partial. One reason for that is 
that VSD only focuses on the design phase and not on the 
application phase. Yet, as we will demonstrate in section 
four of this paper, a large set of these values is also highly 
useful to uphold both during design and application, and 
generally throughout the circular life-cycle of big data tech-
nologies. A second reason for partiality relates to the first, 
and reflects that the values for VSD do not account for the 
circular life-cycle of big data technologies, where phases 
of design and application often overlap or even co-create 
each other. A third reason for partiality is that VSD does 
not take a holistic approach either. VSD does not regard the 
network of stakeholders involved in big data relations as 
sharing responsibility in cultivating values. Although the 
take of designers is crucial in upholding values, the suc-
cessful cultivation of these values hinges upon the shared 
commitment of other stakeholders.
List of values from ‘anticipatory emerging technology 
ethics’
The value list of anticipatory emerging technology ethics, 
which is developed by Philip Brey (2012) is in another way 
different regarding why it is vital and partial in relevance as 
to our integrated approach for big data technologies. The 
value list of anticipatory technology ethics is vital, first of all 
because Brey developed the anticipatory technology ethics 
theory in relation to a diversity of other technology ethics 
literature, such as ethical technology assessment, techno-eth-
ical scenarios and the so-called ETICA approach. By bring-
ing such a broad diversity of individual domains in technol-
ogy ethics together, Brey provides a highly comprehensive 
and in-depth comparative ethical analysis and argumentation 
for his anticipatory emerging technology ethics theory. Sec-
ond, differing from the earlier two lists, values are specified 
for design and application stages within anticipatory tech-
nology ethics and are therefore valuable for our integrated 
approach. Moreover, Brey introduces three stages of technol-
ogy development: the level of the technology, the artefact, 
and the application. He distinguishes these levels from the 
perspective of how values can be integrated. Third, the value 
list of anticipatory emerging technology ethics is vital for 
our approach, because Brey offers for each of these stages a 
reference list of values to uphold from an ethical perspective. 
The values listed in anticipatory emerging technology ethics 
are the following8: harms and risks, rights and freedoms, 
autonomy, human dignity, privacy, property, animal rights 
and animal welfare, (distributive) justice, and well-being and 
the common good (see Table 1).
8 Ibid.
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Reasons why the anticipatory emerging technology eth-
ics list from the perspective of our purposes in this paper 
remains partial are the following. First, Brey defines ‘tech-
nology’ as something that results from any artifact or appli-
cation; ‘artefact’ (including functional systems and proce-
dures) being the things that are on the basis of a technology 
developed; ‘applications’ being the particular ways of using 
an artifact or procedure, or particular ways of configuring 
it[application] for use. Although these stages can make per-
fect sense for certain contexts, given the circular life-cycle 
and the multiplicity of contexts of big data technologies, the 
stages distinguished by Brey would provide a partial fit for 
our integrated approach for big data technologies. Notably, 
within big data contexts it is often difficult to distinguish, for 
instance, whether an application results from a technology 
or a technology results from an application. A second reason 
for partial relevance, which follows from the first, is that 
values are specified separately, and it is not specified which 
values apply simultaneously to both stages, as is the case in 
the context of big data. Third, anticipatory ethics does not 
take a holistic approach and does not include a broad set of 
stakeholders in big data. Consequently, the value list does 
not pay attention to the shared responsibility of stakehold-
ers regarding the implications of technological use and in 
upholding values.
List of values from biomedical ethics
The value list from biomedical ethics provides in another 
set of different reasons why this list is vital, but also partial 
in relevance for our integrated approach regarding big data 
technologies.
The biomedical ethics value list had been developed by 
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2012a, b) in their book Principles of Biomedi-
cal Ethics from 1979. For our integrated approach towards 
big data technologies their value list is vital, first because 
it established far-reaching influence in medical ethics and 
beyond (McCormick 2013; Page 2012; Waltho 2006; Wes-
tin and Nilstun 2006) mostly because of the broad useful-
ness of the convincing moral theory for healthcare these 
values are stemming from. They distinguish the following 
four main principles or values: autonomy, non-maleficence, 
beneficence and justice9 as the most essential guidelines to 
consider within patient and medical professional relations 
(see Table 1). This list had been extended by Snyder and 
Gautier (2008) by two other values: the principle of respect 
for dignity and the principle of veracity (see Table 1).10 Yet, 
the four core values still provide the basis for ethical codes 
and trainings in medicine (Page 2012; Price et al. 1998). 
A second reason why this list is vital for our integrated 
approach is that Beauchamp and Childress explicitly frame 
these values as prima facie duties of healthcare professional. 
In other words, they argue that a continuous ‘duty of care’ 
should sustain these principles during any action in health-
care. This puts an active commitment for ethical handling 
on the shoulders of professionals and such activation for 
ethical actions would also be vital for big data contexts. A 
third reason, why this list is vital for our approach, is that 
Beauchamp and Childress stress, in particular, the impor-
tance of a continuous aspiration for fairness and equality 
during (healthcare) handlings.
The following characteristics render this value list partial 
in relevance for our integrated approach regarding big data 
technologies. First, each of these values had been conceptu-
alized for the phase of practice or application, but not for the 
design. Consequently, this list does not account for the circu-
lar life-cycle of big data technologies either (Custers 2005). 
Second, this is an area-specific professional ethical code list, 
therefore cannot provide a blanker fit for the multiplicity of 
contexts where big data is developed and used. Third, they 
do not have a holistic approach either towards a broad set of 
stakeholders involved in big data contexts. Consequently, 
they are not meant for the mutual cultivation of common 
ethical grounding throughout interactions of stakeholders 
in big data contexts.
Value considerations for techno‑social 
change in big data contexts
Using the methodology described in “Collection and selec-
tion”, we distilled from the four lists of values detailed 
in the previous section a set of ten values in total for big 
data technologies used in multiple contexts: human wel-
fare, autonomy, dignity, privacy, non-maleficence, justice, 
accountability, trustworthiness, solidarity and environmental 
welfare (see Table 1).
In this section we elaborate on each of these values and 
their meaning in emerging big data technologies. First, we 
depict them with reference to all four lists of values detailed 
in the previous section. Second, we demonstrate our argu-
ments why each value should be considered and treated as 
9 These principles can be prioritized, but they need to be considered 
as prime convictions for any healthcare professional while carrying 
out his/her care duties.
10 They argue these principles during medical treatments are of 
additional value. The respect for dignity is considered as a value 
that should be applicable even to patients who are not able to take 
conscious decisions anymore. The principle of veracity is described 
when a ‘capable patient’ needs to acquire an as complete as possible 
‘truth’ knowledge about his or her condition.
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a placeholder for ethical interactions throughout big data 
contexts. The latter also entails that we provide examples 
for issues where each of these values are put under pressure 
in big data contexts. Finally, notwithstanding the starting 
point of this article that all listed values should be upheld 
throughout the whole life-cycle, we will explicate for every 
value in which phase of the big data life-cycle we foresee 
extra attention will be needed to ensure an ethical foundation 
for big data technologies.
Note that we do not put these values in any hierarchical 
order, although we recognize that some of the identified val-
ues can be derived from combinations of other values and 
thereby overlap. Putting the values in a hierarchical order 
would raise many questions that are beyond the scope of this 
paper. We do try to highlight in the text below to what extent 
some values are derived from other values and how values 
from the different lists overlap.
Below we discuss the integrated list of values and illus-
trate how they may be under pressure in contexts of big data 
technologies. The issues putting pressure upon each value 
are also highlighted in Table 2.
Human welfare
Human welfare is perhaps one of the most straightforward 
values to protect (Hurthouse 2006). This value did not come 
explicitly to the foreground on all four value lists, yet each 
list where human welfare is not listed contains values that 
are very close to human welfare.
On the list of technomoral values human welfare can 
rather be seen as related to the value of care. Care (loving 
serving to others) is defined by Vallor as the skilful, atten-
tive, responsible and emotionally responsive disposition to 
personally meet the needs of those with whom we share our 
techno-social environment. In relation to care Vallor argues 
that some of the biggest dangers of emerging technologies 
for human welfare can appear when “emerging technologies 
are used as supplements for human caring” (Vallor 2016, p. 
119), for instance, when a robot delivers medicine could be 
seen as a caring task being completed, yet the human touch 
that a patient would need might be missing. Value-sensitive 
design distinguishes it specifically. In VSD, human welfare 
refers to people’s physical, material, and psychological 
Table 2  Overview of the identified ethical issues
Integration: values for big data technologies Issues putting pressure upon values in the context of big data technologies
Human welfare Discrimination of humans by big data-mediated prejudice can occur. Detrimental implications can 
emerge in the contexts of employment, schooling or travelling by various forms of big data-
mediated unfair treatment of citizens
Autonomy Big data-driven profiling practices can limit free will, free choice and be manipulative in raising 
awareness about, for instance, news, culture, politics and consumption
Non-maleficence Non-transparent data reuse in the world of big data are vast and could have diverse detrimental 
effects for citizens. This puts non-maleficence as a value under pressure
Justice Systematic unfairness can emerge, for instance, by generating false positives during preventative 
law enforcement practices or false negatives during biometric identification processes. (Such 
instances put constant pressure on the value of justice)
Accountability (incl. transparency) For instance, in the healthcare domain patients or in the marketing domain consumers often do not 
know what it means and who to turn to when their data is shared via surveys for research and 
marketing purposes
Trustworthiness Citizens often do not know how to tackle a big data-based calculation about them or how to refute 
their digital profile, in case there are falsely accused, e.g.: false negatives during biometric identi-
fication, false positives during profiling practices. Their trust is then undermined. The technology 
operators’ trust at the same time lies too much in the system
Privacy Simply the myriad of correlations between personal data in big data schemes allows for easy iden-
tifiability, this can lead to many instances for privacy intrusion
Dignity Adverse consequences of algorithmic profiling, such as discrimination or stigmatization also dem-
onstrate that dignity is fragile in many contexts of big data. Being confronted with opaque data-
driven decisions, a citizen may experience a Kafkaesque situation in which her view and agency 
is no longer acknowledged. When a person is no longer treated as someone with particular inter-
ests, feelings and commitments, but merely as a bundle of data, her dignity can be compromised
Solidarity Big data-based calculations, in which commercial interests are prioritized above non-profit-led 
interests, are examples of situations in which solidarity is under pressure. Or another example is, 
for instance, when falsely accused immigrants by digital profiling, they may not have the legal 
position to defend themselves. Both are instances of non-solidary treatment
Environmental welfare Big data has rather indirect effects on the environment. But for instance, lithium mining for bat-
teries is such. (But extending the life-expectancy of batteries and, for instance, using more sun-
energy for longer-lasting batteries could be helpful.)
218 K. La Fors et al.
1 3
well-being. Anticipatory emerging technology ethics refers 
to well-being and the common good in general. Brey refers 
to well-being as one of the most general values on his list. 
In anticipatory technology ethics well-being means being 
supportive of happiness, health, knowledge, wisdom, vir-
tue, friendship, trust, achievement desire-fulfillment. This 
also includes being supportive of vital social institutions and 
structures, democratic institutions and cultural diversity. In 
biomedical ethics the value of beneficence is described as 
the principle of acting with the best interest of the other 
in mind. Therefore, from the value list of biomedical eth-
ics beneficence is therefore most closely related to human 
welfare. Beneficence can also be regarded as something that 
preserves human welfare. Welfare may also overlap with the 
value of solidarity (see below).
Regarding our criteria for an integrated approach that 
accounts for the circular life cycle of big data and that a 
broad range of stakeholders have a share in how values 
become upheld in big data contexts, human welfare finds 
a pivotal place on our value list. Human welfare should be 
accounted for both during the design and the application 
stage of big data technologies,—no matter whether these 
stages follow-up, run parallel or are self-generating each 
other holistically by all stakeholders. This value can explic-
itly be put under pressure in big data contexts as the example 
of the healthcare robot, also referred to by Vallor (Ibid.), also 
demonstrates this. Healthcare robots are designed to regis-
ter patient’s data. Yet, in practice newer and newer data is 
fed into robots by multiple stakeholders, e.g. doctors, phar-
macists, nurses or others, generating new data by regular 
updates and prognosis on a patient’s health condition. The 
latter could also be considered as a form of self-generated 
renewal in design regarding prognosis on a patient’s health 
by big data. Although the role of robots in supplying ser-
vices for patients (and healthcare workers) should not be 
underestimated, this example also underlines that the net-
work of designers, developers, users and other stakeholders, 
including robots themselves, mutually share responsibility 
in how human welfare as a value becomes upheld or put 
under pressure throughout the whole lifecycle of big data 
technologies.
Autonomy
Autonomy as a value is present on the value lists of VSD, 
anticipatory technology ethics and biomedical ethics, but 
not on the list of techno moral values. Autonomy on the 
VSD list refers to people’s ability to decide, plan, and act 
in ways that they believe will help them to achieve their 
goals. In anticipatory emerging technology ethics, autonomy 
is the ability to think one’s own thoughts and form one’s 
own opinions and the ability to make one’s own choices. 
According to anticipatory emerging technology ethics, 
autonomy pre-requires responsibility and accountability 
and in the digital era it should also include informed con-
sent. In biomedical ethics, autonomy, as mentioned above, 
is the right of the individual of making his or her own deci-
sion or choice. Vallor’s technomoral value of magnanimity 
and courage—daring to take risks—are closely related to 
autonomy. Magnanimity or moral leadership, for instance, 
in Vallor’s view is a value that everyone needs to culti-
vate in him/herself. Magnanimous leaders are those who 
can inspire, guide, mentor and lead the rest of us at least 
towards the vicinity of the good. Magnanimity is therefore 
a quality of someone who can by example be a moral leader 
especially during techno-social change. Such stakeholders 
as technology designer, entrepreneurs, data scientists but 
also others involved in big data networks should dispose 
with this quality or ethical characteristic. The technomoral 
value of courage, what Vallor describes as intelligent fear 
and hope, is also closely related to autonomy because only a 
person who is autonomous could choose courageously. Yet, 
courage facilitates autonomy. Courage is a special facilitator 
of autonomy, because it is an admirable quality for making 
rather difficult choices than easy ones. As to emerging tech-
nologies, Vallor calls for embracing this value by cultivating 
a “reliable disposition toward intelligent fear and hope with 
respect to the moral and material dangers and opportunities 
presented by emerging technologies”. Certain expectations 
are by design inherent in big data technologies, yet unex-
pected implications emerge trough their use. To cultivate 
a reliable disposition toward intelligent fear and hope by 
humans and to equip stakeholders by features that facilitate 
such disposition are both pivotal requirements to enact a 
form of autonomy that is conscious about the unexpected 
implications of big data use.
An autonomous person in our big data era should desir-
ably be a magnanimous and courageous one in his/her 
activities. Furthermore, this autonomy should be facilitated 
by the broader network of stakeholders connected to big 
technologies. In order to uphold autonomy, it is crucial to 
acknowledge the connection between the design stage and 
the application stage. A feature that is instrumental in facili-
tating such autonomy by a diverse set of big data stakehold-
ers is transparency. If transparency is put under pressure in 
the design stage, so is autonomy in the application stage. For 
instance, if a big data mediated decision process is designed 
in such a manner that there is no way for citizens to come 
to understand how a decision has been reached, they can-
not enact their autonomous character, for instance, to seek 
recourse. Furthermore, autonomy can also be in danger 
when big data-driven profiling practices limit free will, free 
choice and turn out to be rather manipulative instead of sup-
portive in raising awareness or cultivating knowledge about, 
for instance, news, culture, politics and consumption. As this 
could be an unforeseen consequence of the application of big 
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data technologies, it is necessary to keep a close eye on how 
autonomy actually takes shape in practice. Consequently, 
autonomy should be embraced as a value throughout the 
entire life-cycle of big data technologies, with extra attention 
to the direct connection between the design and application 
stage.
Dignity
Dignity (Düwell 2017) as a value cannot be found on all 
four lists of values, only on the list of anticipatory emerging 
technology ethics and biomedical ethics. Human dignity in 
anticipatory emerging technology ethics includes both self-
respect and respect towards all humans by humans without 
any interest. On the list of technomoral values empathy is 
closest in notions to dignity. Empathy (compassionate con-
cern for others) is explained by Vallor as a technomoral 
value that cultivates openness to being morally moved to a 
caring action and led by the emotions of the other members 
of our technosocial world. This could mean for cultivating 
compassion both for others’ joy as well as pain. Vallor calls 
for embracing this value, because the amount of joyful and 
painful events that are mediated via digital technologies is 
unseen, therefore we can too often be called for empathic 
action. Nevertheless, she argues that we need to adapt our 
receptors of empathy to these technological changes. This 
is crucial in order not to become narcissists and we consider 
this is also crucial to uphold someone’s dignity within big 
data contexts.
The value-sensitive design list does not refer to dignity 
but to identity. Yet, in our view these two notions are inter-
twined. In VSD, identity refers to people’s understanding of 
who they are, embracing both continuity and discontinuity 
over time, but dignity also requires a similar understanding 
so that one can respect this value. Following from this we 
could say that dignity and identity mutually predestine each 
other: when dignity is preserved so is identity, and when 
identity is preserved so is dignity. Human dignity can there-
fore be regarded as a prime principle since all implications 
of big data-mediated interactions affect humans and to dif-
fering degrees also their identity and dignity.
Dignity is under pressure in big data contexts. For 
instance, when revealing too much about a user to others, 
principles of data minimization and design requirements 
of encryption appear to be insufficient. Adverse conse-
quences of algorithmic profiling, such as discrimination or 
stigmatization demonstrate that dignity is fragile in many 
contexts of big data, but it in particular becomes pressured 
in the application stage. Being confronted with discrimi-
nating profiles and opaque data-driven decisions, a citizen 
may experience a Kafkaesque situation in which her view 
and agency no longer is acknowledged. When a person 
no longer is treated as someone with particular interests, 
feelings and commitments, but merely as a bundle of data, 
her dignity may be compromised. The example of a black 
couple having been auto-tagged as gorillas (Gray 2015), also 
demonstrate this. For instance, by actively raising aware-
ness about the consequences of online search results upon 
algorithmic decision-making processes, where search results 
are predicated upon the design and application of big data, 
could assist in effectuating respect for the value of dignity 
in big data contexts. By raising awareness and, if stakehold-
ers acknowledge their responsibilities in upholding dignity, 
much of the diverse effects of big data-mediated interactions 
can be minimized.
Privacy
Big data based analytics are often highly privacy-invasive; 
therefore we acknowledge the importance of privacy as a 
value and include it also on our list of values for big data 
contexts. Out of the four lists of values detailed in section 
three only value-sensitive design lists privacy as a separate 
value to cherish. The value lists of biomedical ethics and 
technomoral values do not refer to privacy explicitly. Antic-
ipatory emerging technology ethics in relation to privacy 
focuses on the fundamental right to privacy and on notions 
of privacy that are known from the data protection perspec-
tives, such as informational privacy but also on its physical 
extensions such as the notion of bodily privacy depicts this. 
A third notion of privacy in anticipatory emerging tech-
nology ethics relates to the relational character of privacy. 
This is also a useful notion for the integrated approach in 
this paper, as privacy should come about through mutually 
respected (not only legal) agreements among stakeholders. 
Anticipatory emerging technology ethics underlines that 
privacy has a property component, therefore the value of 
property in a certain form is also considered useful to sup-
port privacy.
VSD refers to privacy as a claim, an entitlement, or a 
right of an individual to determine what information about 
him or herself can be communicated to others. Given the 
scope of privacy for big data networks, we also considered 
informed consent and ownership and property as related val-
ues. Informed consent refers to garnering people’s agree-
ment, encompassing criteria of disclosure and comprehen-
sion (for “informed”) and voluntariness, competence, and 
agreement (for “consent”). Ownership and property refers to 
a right to possess an object (or information), use it, manage 
it, derive income from it, and bequeath it. All these rights 
can be regarded as substitutes of a broader definition of pri-
vacy, as for instance, personal data can be owned by others 
than the individual referred to by the data within big data 
contexts. Therefore, actively enacting the value of informed 
consent is another prerequisite to facilitate privacy as a value 
by all stakeholders in big data-mediated relationships.
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Since the rise of the internet there is extensive literature 
on privacy (Custers and Ursic 2016; De Hert and Gutwirth 
2006; Gray and Citron 2013; Hildebrandt and de Vries 2013; 
Koops et al. 2017; Moerel et al. 2016; Nissenbaum 2010; 
Omer and Polonetsky 2012). Privacy as an ethical value for 
big data contexts is the closest in its scope to privacy as 
a fundamental right (as also listed on Brey’s list). Privacy 
as fundamental value first includes respect for others, and 
specifically respect for someone’s private sphere, conversa-
tions, writing—e.g. confidentiality of mail—and also any 
action that one keeps intentionally unexposed to the broad 
public. A cornerstone of privacy as a fundamental value lies 
in respecting the boundaries someone else has drawn him/
herself and the boundaries one would also like to be seen 
protected from intrusion by others.
These instances of privacy within big data-mediated 
interactions are under constant pressure. Persons can 
increasingly easily be identified in datasets even if technical 
measures of anonymization are in place. Simply the myriad 
of correlations between personal data in big data schemes 
allows for easy identifiability. Therefore, the growing tech-
nological possibilities offered by big data allow for many 
ways to disrespect one’s private interactions and relations. 
Therefore, privacy needs to be at the heart of the design 
process, by making sure it is a key design requirement and 
not merely something that is being “added” at the end. How-
ever, due to the mentioned possibilities of identifying or 
singling out someone, privacy can also become under siege 
in the implementation and application stage. Therefore, an 
integrated approach in respecting one’s privacy holistically 
by all stakeholders remains pivotal.
Non‑maleficence
Non-maleficence is the value of not causing harm to others. 
Non-maleficence is only explicitly stated as a core value on 
the value list of biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and Chil-
dress 2012a, b). Non-maleficence, according to Beauchamp 
and Childress, is rooted in the Hippocratic Oath, and means 
‘above all, do no harm’ to others. Regarding the technomoral 
values of Vallor, non-maleficence is intertwined with humil-
ity and self-control. Regarding the value sensitive design 
value list, calmness (or certain degree of self-control) is 
most closely related to non-maleficence. Considering the 
anticipatory emerging technology ethics list avoiding harms 
and risks as core principle provides the closest overlap with 
the value of non-maleficence.
Humility focuses on knowing what we do not know. 
Vallor stresses the importance of this value regarding new 
technologies, because practicing humility as a technomoral 
virtue, in her view acknowledges “the real limits of our 
technosocial knowledge and ability, reverence and power at 
the universe’s power to surprise and confound us, and the 
renunciation of the blind faith that new technologies inevita-
bly lead to human mastery and control of our environments”. 
Practicing humility in a big data era, therefore, could serve 
as an ethically cautious behaviour both during design and 
application of big data. Calmness in VSD refers to a peace-
ful and composed psychological state can be regarded as a 
pre-requisite for remaining non-maleficent within and across 
big data contexts. Avoiding harms and risks is a principle 
and desired attitude which in Brey’s view encompasses that 
new technologies may contain different harms and risks con-
sequently precaution toward these technologies is necessary. 
This implicit precautionary attitude renders this principle 
of Brey being closely related the value of non-maleficence 
(‘do not harm11’).
Non-maleficence is first and foremost a central value in 
the design process. Actors such as developers, data scien-
tists, and commissioning parties have to anticipate and take 
into account the wider societal impact of their applications. 
It has to be noted that, within the context of big data tech-
nologies, non-maleficence is perhaps one of the most dif-
ficult values to implement as the predictive logic in big data 
based algorithms can often result in unforeseeably offensive 
outcomes. These algorithmically mediated results of big data 
can therefore easily put pressure upon non-maleficence. For 
instance, false positive matches in law enforcement, such as 
the recent case of falsely flagged children as security risks 
on no-fly lists in Canada, demonstrate that big data-based 
analysis can result in unjustified accusations of innocent 
persons (Bronskill 2018). In order to uphold non-malefi-
cence, it is important to be humble and acknowledge that 
big data technologies might have unforeseen and unwanted 
consequences. Therefore, non-maleficence both as a design 
requirement for technologies and an attitude requirement for 
a wide range of stakeholders, including policy makers, data 
scientists and users should be embraced throughout different 
contexts of big data.
Justice
Justice as a value can be considered as a prime requirement 
in everyday life. Except the list of VSD, justice appears on 
all three other lists. Justice on the techno moral value list 
is the broadest among values and based on Aristotelian 
and Confucian understandings Vallor explains justice as 
the “just treatment of others”. We can also understand this 
value under the broader notion of human benevolence. Val-
lor claims that “data-mining, pervasive digital surveillance 
11 Within anticipatory emerging technology ethics typical harms may 
include health and bodily harm, pain and suffering, psychological 
harm, harm to human capabilities, environmental harm and harms to 
society.
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and algorithmic profiling, robotics” currently fuel the growth 
in social inequalities and technomoral justice is needed to 
restore or remedy inequalities. In biomedical ethics justice is 
about upholding rightness. In anticipatory emerging technol-
ogy ethics justice is understood in its broadest terms. Justice 
involves the just distribution of primary goods, capabilities, 
risks and hazards, non-discrimination and equal treatment 
relative to age, gender, sexual orientation, social class, 
race, ethnicity, religion, disability, etc. Furthermore, it also 
involves the geographical dimensions, as global north–south 
justice and age-related aspects, such as intergenerational 
justice.
Value-sensitive design does not list justice as a value spe-
cifically. It lists however freedom from bias and universal 
usability and we consider these two closely related to jus-
tice. First, regarding the freedom from bias Friedman et al. 
underline the essential need to prevent or remedy “system-
atic unfairness” as a form of bias. Within the context of big 
data, systematic unfairness can also be regarded as a form 
of pressure upon the value of justice. Systematic unfairness 
occurs, for instance, in the stage of analysis when false nega-
tives are generated during biometric identification processes 
of migrants (La Fors-Owczynik 2016; La Fors-Owczynik 
and Van der Ploeg 2015) or false positives of suspects (Tims 
2015). However, justice as a value also plays an important 
role in both the implementation and application stage. Given 
that big data accelerates the speed and quantity of data trans-
fer and creates immense possibilities for reuse, instances for 
false identity verification, false accusation or stigmatization 
as a consequence of big data-led correlations also grow. Sec-
ond, universal usability as a value on the VSD list refers to 
making persons successful users of information technology. 
Although success is a highly contested notion, we consider 
here a mutually respectful and just design and application 
of big data technologies holistically by all stakeholders as a 
form of success. All in all, justice is a value that is central to 
all stages of the big data life cycle.
Accountability
Accountability is a value that requires constant assessment 
in democratic societies (Braithwaite 2006; Jos and Tomp-
kins 2004). From the four lists of values, accountability is 
explicitly stated only on the list of value-sensitive design. In 
VSD accountability refers to the properties, which facilitate 
that the actions of a person or institution are traceable to that 
person or institution. The technomoral value ‘perspective’ 
encompasses pivotal qualities for upholding accountability. 
As Vallor argues ‘perspective’ means the acknowledgement 
that emerging technologies will have implications that are 
“global in scale and unforeseeable in depth”. Cultivating 
perspective (holding on to the moral whole) as a value, Val-
lor argues, is necessary because by doing it we acknowledge 
that the emerging technologies we continuously develop 
have implications that are unparalleled, global in scale and 
perhaps unforeseeable in depth. Accountability as a value 
does not appear on the value list of anticipatory emerging 
technologies and of biomedical ethics.
Yet, given our integrated approach for big data technolo-
gies and the fact that the techno-social choices for and impli-
cations of using big data technologies increasingly magnify, 
accountability is a pivotal value on our list for big data. 
Transparency is a facilitator of accountability, in a similar 
way as it is a key condition for autonomy. If transparency is 
under pressure in domains of big data, so is accountability. 
For instance, auto-tagging instances can result in highly dis-
criminative and offensive outcomes and put pressure on this 
value. Instances, when for example, two black persons have 
been tagged as gorillas (Gray 2015) or when the Dachau 
concentration camp has been tagged as a sport centre on a 
web-site (Hern 2015) demonstrates pressure upon the value 
of accountability. It is difficult to identify which parties in 
these big data mediated contexts are responsible for such 
offensive outcomes. Is it the algorithm, the designer, the 
user of a certain programme or also those searching users 
from whom an algorithm learns, or perhaps more of them? 
Given our holistic approach we consider that accountability 
is a pivotal value to uphold within all big data contexts, yet it 
pre-requires more transparent structures in big data networks 
and efforts from all stakeholders.
Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness is a value that requires mutual caring espe-
cially in a networked world (Keymolen 2016). From our four 
lists only VSD refers to this value, more specifically to trust. 
In VSD trust is described through the expectations that exist 
between people who can experience good will, act with good 
will toward others, feel vulnerable, and experience betrayal. 
Honesty and self-control are values on the list of techno-
moral values that are closest in notion to trustworthiness. 
Honesty and self-control can be regarded as qualities of a 
person upon which his/her trustworthiness can rely. On the 
anticipatory emerging technology ethics list no trustworthi-
ness, honesty or trust is mentioned. On the biomedical ethics 
lists we consider veracity—telling the truth—as most closely 
related to trustworthiness.
As to honesty from the techno-moral value list, although 
the parameters of one general truth are quite difficult if 
not impossible to outline as Vallor points out, because 
the truth content of a message can change by to whom we 
speak, where we gather our information or how we present 
it. Still the intention of speaking with honesty within the 
context of big data is a desirable quality, because honesty 
(‘respecting truth’) serves flourishing in interactions with 
other people. Vallor argues that upholding honesty shall 
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be the primary task of ethics, because human flourishing 
would be “impossible without the general expectation of 
honesty”. In this respect honesty is also connected to self-
control. Vallor explains self-control as a person’s “ability 
to align one’s desire with the good” that includes good will 
and good intention. Both honesty and self-control underpin 
trustworthiness and only increase its relevance for big data 
contexts. Regarding the biomedical ethics list, trustworthi-
ness is closely related to the value of veracity. The principle 
of veracity, when implemented as a moral requirement for 
big data collectors, data brokers, data scientists and other 
stakeholders would increase trustworthiness within relation-
ships in big data networks. Therefore, given our integrated 
approach for big data contexts and the fact that trustworthi-
ness is under constant pressure within big data contexts, to 
embrace trustworthiness holistically by all stakeholders is 
crucial. In particular, trustworthiness can become set under 
pressure in the application stage; for instance, because 
data transfer processes are obscure and citizens can easily 
become victims of precautionary algorithmic decisions as 
citizens are unable to refute the basis up which such deci-
sions were drawn, see for instance occurrences of false posi-
tives in law enforcement (“False match shows no fly-list isn’t 
perfect,” 2010). Therefore upholding trustworthiness as a 
value is of utmost worth throughout all interactions in big 
data networks, and especially those that fall beyond the limi-
tations of law. Given the relational character of this value—it 
can only flourish in interaction—prescribing the practice of 
trustworthiness (and also veracity) for all stakeholders dur-
ing big data-based processes could, for instance, strengthen 
the effectivity of such legal prescriptions as informed con-
sent (Custers et al. 2013, 2014); the right not to be subject to 
profiling or the right to explanation. These rights can easily 
be violated when trustworthiness, veracity and honesty are 
not effectuated in big data networks.
Solidarity
Solidarity as a value does not appear on any of the value lists 
referred to above. Yet, we consider solidarity as a highly rel-
evant value in domains of big data (Tischner 2005). In VSD, 
the value of courtesy seems being the closest in notion to it. 
In VSD, courtesy refers to treating people with politeness 
and consideration.
Out of the technomoral value list empathy, flexibility, 
courage and civility relate most to solidarity as these val-
ues can be seen as building blocks to cultivate a mutually 
shared and upheld attitude of solidarity. Solidarity is a 
value which has been embraced to different degrees over 
time. For instance, before the fall of the iron curtain in 
Poland, solidarity became a value that assembled crowds, 
creating a new positive ideology of compassion and broth-
erhood against decades of Soviet political oppression. This 
symbolic but also enacted form of solidarity in today’s 
circumstances, at least in Western Europe, cannot be com-
parable as there is no oppression. Yet, the implications 
of showing/expressing solidarity in daily life by having 
the courage to come up for others and having the flex-
ibility—the latter being closely related to the liberal value 
of tolerance according to Vallor—in order to “enable the 
co-flourishing of diverse human societies” is crucial to 
uphold during discussions on big data. Empathy (com-
passionate concern for others) as mentioned earlier is a 
value that cultivates openness to being morally moved to 
caring action by the emotions of the other members of 
our techno-social world. This is an essential quality of 
being solidaire with someone else. Flexibility as a techno 
moral value(skilful adaptation to change) is a highly use-
ful enabler of solidarity as it facilitates the co-flourishing 
of diverse human societies and requires mutual cultiva-
tion. As to courage, solidarity requires courage from those 
who want to enact compassionate behaviour with others 
and therefore require risk taking and prioritizing inter-
ests with a goodwill for others. Solidarity also resonates 
with civility, which according to Vallor (making common 
cause) is the “sincere disposition to live well with one’s 
fellow citizens of a globally networked information soci-
ety, to collectively and wisely deliberate about matters 
of local, national and global policy and to work coop-
eratively towards those goods of techno social life that 
we seek and expect to share with others”. Solidarity may 
also overlap with welfare (see above), because from some 
perspectives (such as Shannon’s technomoral values) both 
values are focused on a responsive disposition towards 
others. However, from other perspectives (such as VSD), 
welfare focuses more on individual well-being. Therefore, 
we include both welfare and solidarity as a separate values 
in our list, because welfare focuses more on the individual 
aspect and solidarity focuses more on the inter-relational, 
societal aspect.
Given these qualities underpinning solidarity as well as 
our integrated approach and holistic view on stakeholders, 
it is also highly important to stress that solidarity within 
big data networks requires mutually respectful cooperation 
of stakeholders. This can especially be seen as an asset 
when limitations for the use of novel big data technologies 
are scarce yet. Many instances of big data-based calcula-
tions in which commercial interests are prioritized versus 
non-profit interests, are examples of situations in which 
solidarity is under pressure. When, for instance, immi-
grants are screened by big data-based technologies, they 
may not have the legal, lingual, physical or psychological 
position or capacity to defend themselves from potential 
false accusations resulting from digital profiling. These 
are examples of solidarity being under pressure within big 
data-based interactions.
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Environmental welfare
This value only appears as environmental sustainability on 
the list of value-sensitive design. The value list of biomedi-
cal ethics does not include it. On the list of techno moral val-
ues empathy and courage seem most closely related to it, and 
on the list of anticipatory emerging technology ethics ‘no 
environmental harm (including animal welfare)’ is closest 
in notion. On the list of VSD, environmental sustainability 
refers to sustaining ecosystems such that they meet the needs 
of the present without compromising future generations. The 
list of anticipatory emerging technology ethics contains no 
harm, this also entails the prohibition of causing environ-
mental harm (including animal welfare). Among the techno 
moral values, empathy and courage seem to be the most 
closely related to environmental welfare. Although empa-
thy has not been developed as a concept concerning non-
humans, the environment (including animals), for instance, 
in Japanese (Callicott and McRae 2017) and tribal philoso-
phies, such as the Native American culture (Booth 2008) or 
the South-African Ubuntu (Chuwa 2014) culture is highly 
respected, potentially as much as human life.
Given our integrated and holistic approach although 
big data has rather indirect effects on the environment, for 
instance the current rush for lithium in Latin-America (Fran-
kel and Whoriskey 2016), which is the critical ingredient of 
all batteries on the world, shows how environmental welfare 
as a value is under pressure by big data technologies. Con-
sidering environmental welfare in big data contexts an envi-
ronment conscious mind-set could help limit the negative 
implications of big data technologies throughout the whole 
big data life-cycle. For instance, the use of lithium based bat-
teries puts pressure upon the value of environmental welfare. 
However, the wider use of solar energy-based batteries could 
limit the specific negative effects of big data technologies on 
the environment. Limiting such negative effects is also cru-
cial, because any pressure upon the value of environmental 
welfare can also negatively affect human welfare.
Certainly our list including these ten values, summarized 
in Table 1, is not exhaustive. Yet, these ten value dimensions 
are comprehensive with respect to emerging big data tech-
nologies in multiple contexts. This value list is also aimed 
at providing value-specific perspectives for discussion. Such 
discussions could regard the extent to which using big data 
technologies brings along issues that put pressure upon piv-
otal ethical values in our current societies (Table 2). Human 
welfare, autonomy, non-maleficence, justice, accountability, 
trust, privacy, dignity, solidarity, environmental welfare are 
all values that are constantly under pressure within the con-
text of big data and in our view deserve reflection throughout 
the circular life cycle of big data technologies in all contexts 
by the broadest range of stakeholders involved.
Conclusions
Emerging big data technologies are putting increasing pres-
sure upon the boundaries of what can or cannot be con-
sidered acceptable from an ethical perspective. Important 
values like autonomy, non-discrimination, fairness, justice, 
privacy and human dignity are at stake. Although a lot of 
valuable research is already available on values under pres-
sure of emerging big data technologies, it often does not take 
a holistic approach. This can be a miss, particularly when 
values are competing. More holistic approaches that are 
available usually focus on either a design-based approach, in 
which it is tried to implement values into the design of new 
technologies, or an application-based approach, in which it 
is tried to address the ways in which new technologies are 
used. However, there does not exist an integrated approach 
that covers the whole lifecycle of big data technologies. 
The neat theoretical distinction between different stages of 
technological innovation does not always exist in practice, 
especially not in the development of big data technologies. 
What is supposed to be a staged development process, from 
the flexible stage of invention or design to the more closed 
stage of adoption and use, in practice often is an iterative 
approach in which new technologies and new applications 
of existing technologies are built on each other. In such 
processes, the different stages are sometimes overlapping, 
sometimes non-sequential and sometimes running in paral-
lel. Another miss in the existing literature is that none of the 
ethical approaches is specifically focused on big data and 
big data technologies. The existing approaches typically are 
somewhat general in nature, which offers a broad scope of 
applying them, but this may not always be tailored to the 
specific nature of big data related ethical issues.
In this paper we have integrated ethical values from exist-
ing design-based and application-based ethical approaches 
for new technologies and further focus this integrated result 
to the context of emerging big data technologies. A total of 
four value lists were selected for this integration: one list 
from techno moral values, one from value-sensitive design, 
one from anticipatory emerging technology ethics and one 
from biomedical ethics. This integrated list consists of a total 
of ten values: human welfare, autonomy, non-maleficence, 
justice, accountability, trustworthiness, privacy, dignity, 
solidarity and environmental welfare. Together, this set of 
integrated values provides a comprehensive and in-depth 
overview of the values that are to be taken into account for 
emerging big data technologies. As such, this integrated list 
of values challenges us to reflect on what human flourishing 
in the big data era comes down to, what the necessary con-
ditions are to ensure this flourishing and what people need 
in order to bring these values in practice. This integrated, 
holistic approach allows all actors involved in emerging big 
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data technologies, such as engineers, developers, designers, 
data scientists, users, data subjects, citizens, policy mak-
ers and legislators to consider where they can take joint 
responsibility.
This holistic integration of ethical values for big data 
contexts also supports the importance of carrying out soci-
etal impact assessments periodically. Things change rapidly 
in the area of big data technologies. Therefore, periodical 
assessments seem crucial. Also the fact that a lot of this 
is context-dependent and many values are interconnected 
calls for further research. To conclude, upholding these val-
ues should be regarded as a continuous goal to aspire to 
and as a mindset in practice throughout big data-mediated 
interactions.
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Appendix A: Longlist of literature on value 
lists
 I. Historical lists in virtue ethics
1. Value list of Aristotle (Aristotle 1947)
2. Value list of St. Thomas of Aquinas (McInerny 
1997)
 II. Prominent for the disciple of healthcare:
3. Principles of biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2012a, b)
4. Ethical principles for medical research involving 
human subjects (Declaration of Helsinki) (World 
Medical Association 2010)
5. Nine ethical values of master therapists (Jennings 
et al. 2005)
6. Health technology assessment (Turchetti et al. 2010)
7. Food ethics. Mepham’s ethical matrix (Mepham 
2010)
 III. Prominent for certain disciplines:
 8. National Society of Professional Engineers 
(NSPE Ethics Reference Guide for Engineers 
2017)
 9. Social work ethics—as a professional field of 
applied ethics (Parrot 2014)
 10. Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics 
(Society of Professional Journalists 2014)
 11. Ethical principles for teachers http://schoolofedu-
cators.com/2012/06/ethical-principles-for-teach-
ers/
 12. Social work ethics—as a professional field of ap-
plied ethics (Parrot 2014)
 IV. Design-based:
 13. Value-sensitive design (Friedman et al. 2006)
 V. Application-based/procedural:
 14. Google’s AI principles, see https ://blog.googl e/
techn ology /ai/ai-princ iples /
 15. Data sheets for data sets (Gebru et al. 2018)
 VI. Relevant for emerging and novel technologies:
 16. Anticipatory emerging technology ethics (Brey 
2012)
 17. Ethical Delphi (Millar et al. 2007)
 18. Technomoral values (Shannon Vallor 2017)
 VII. Novel branches of virtue ethics:
 19. Feminists ethics, see https ://plato .stanf ord.edu/
entri es/femin ism-ethic s/
 20. Insurrectionist ethics lists (McBride 2017)
 21. Marxist ethics, see http://isj.org.uk/marxi sm-and-
ethic s/
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